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ABSTRACT
This paper tries to contribute towards the solution of an
important question raised in [4]: What is a Software Engi-
neering (SE) specific theory? Which are the main features
of a theory that is endemic to SE? In this paper we will use
“theory” as the term is used in traditional sciences. Other
uses of the term “theory” are discussed. Finally, we propose
to focus on the reference class and on the structuring of SE
theories as a basis for further progress.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.0 [Software Engineering]: General
General Terms
Theory, Verification
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1. INTRODUCTION
Semantics is the field concerned mainly with meaning and
true [2]. In particular, the semantics of science are concerned
with the sense, the reference and the truth of those scientific
sentences which, expressed in different formalisms, consti-
tute scientific theories. In factual (i.e. non-formal) sciences,
theories are well-structured bodies of sentences about real
objects, their properties and their processes. In formal sci-
ences, on the other hand, the sentences in a theory refer to
conceptual items, like the triangle, or pi. The discussion in
this paper will be related to the reference of factual scientific
theories, leaving the sense and truth value out of scope.
For example, the Kinetic Theory of Gases (KTG) is a
body of sentences, expressed in a mathematical formalism,
that refer to molecules of a gas, describing their movements
and other features from which high-level properties are de-
rived (gas temperature, pressure, volume, etc.). It is obvious
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that KTG does not deal with electromagnetic fields or, in
other words, electromagnetic fields do not constitute the ref-
erence of KTG. This seems pretty obvious in this example,
but is not so obvious in other fields of science and, in par-
ticular, in novel fields of study, as discussed later.
The objects that are the referents of a particular sentence
constitute its reference class. However, we must take into
account that, in science, reference classes may be hypotheti-
cal or non-existent. For instance, the luminous ether was the
subject of many a theory in the 19th Century. It would not
be correct to say that theories about the luminous ether had
no reference. Similarly, it would be incorrect to say that the-
ories about dinosaur disappearance have no reference class.
It is more precise to say that the extension of those theories
happens to be empty, but their intended (i.e. hypothetical)
reference class is not. In fact, if the extension is not yet
determined, at least the theory can guide researchers in the
search for evidences in support of its existence, like fossils.
This process also takes place in Theoretical Physics, when a
particle is first postulated.
In brief, any sentence that is part of a scientific theory
(i) has a reference class; (ii) can be supported (or not) by
a set of empirical findings and (iii) a truth value can be
attributed to it. However, it is better not to confuse those
things. The reference class of a theory is not the same as
its empirical proofs. These are, in some cases, a small sub-
set of the reference class or, if not, they can be connected
to the reference class through a chain of auxiliary theories,
like those about the behavior of observation instruments [2].
What is important is that, for a scientific theory, having a
nonempty reference class is a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition for being empirically testable. In consequence, be-
fore testing a theory we first should know what the theory is
talking about, and for choosing between competing theories
we must be sure that they are about the same things.
With this in mind, looking to the field of Software Engi-
neering (SE) and looking at some of its most widely used
theoretical sentences [3], we could ask: are Conway’s law
and Brooks’ law talking about the same things? In other
words, are they competing? Are they mutually supportive
or are they completely independent? Empirical proofs of
one of those laws could be used as empirical proofs of the
other? Is Parnas’s principle of information hiding a compet-
ing theory of Conway’s law? If they are not competing, do
they overlap? Could both of them be part of a same um-
brella theory? Also, it has been pointed out that Dijkstra’s
famous attack on the GOTO statement is a theory of cog-
nitive limits [5]. Then, should human minds belong to the
reference class of that theory? If this is true, in the search for
empirical evidence perhaps we should pay attention to what
psychologists have to say, in addition to computer scientists.
In consequence, the semantics of science are very relevant
for, and should precede, the methodology of science [2]. The
position advocated in this paper is that it would be very
helpful, before developing SE-specific theories, to first clarify
their hypothetical reference class. This is not an empty exer-
cise, as it would help to define the universe of discourse and
the subject matter of those theories. Additionally, from a
methodological viewpoint, this is a helpful exercise for iden-
tifying competing theories, for searching empirical evidence
that supports them and for finding to which extent some
theories give account of particular facts (for instance, em-
pirical evidence that was not supported by Newton’s gravity
was supported by Einstein’s). But first let’s briefly discuss
what we mean when we say that we miss theories for SE.
2. WHAT DO WE MISS IN SE?
A desire for theory has been expressed many times in the
literature, but the use of particular theories as a background
to many SE published research is negligible [4]. However,
there are two issues related to the use of “theory” that we
would like to clarify1.
2.1 Do we miss “theoretical content” in SE?
It is important to point out the distinction between the-
ory and “theoretical content”. This is a distinction widely
used by students and teachers. They regard as “theoretical”
a class where the teacher talks about the syntax of a pro-
gramming language, for instance. On the contrary, a class
where students develop actual programs would be consid-
ered “practical”. This usage of “theory” is mainly to differ-
entiate practical studies from those which are not. In this
regard, “Film Theory” embraces the studies about films and
filmmaking, but is not related to the actual task of film pro-
duction. “Feminist Theory” analyzes gender inequality. The
“Theory of Poetry” embraces studies about poetry as a lit-
erary form. There is even an “Architectural Theory”, about
the artistical and social dimension of architecture, with no
direct relation to the underlying theories of structures or ma-
terials. Even in formal sciences “theory” sometimes points
to collections of related “theoretical content”, like in “game
theory” or “network theory”, which designate broad areas.
This usage of “theory”does not happen in well established
factual sciences, as these sciences strongly emphasize the
need for empirical data in support (or against) any theory.
Clearly “Einstein’s theory” is not just a set of studies on the
speed of light and the space-time curvature: it has strong
empirical support. Scientific theories can even be classi-
fied according to the degree of empirical support they have,
which would be difficult to do with film or feminist “theo-
ries”. Additionally, from a scientific theory it is always possi-
ble to derive statements that can empirically tested. Again,
that would be very difficult to do for “film theory” and even
for “game theory” alone, without the addition of further cor-
respondences between the theory and the real world.
It is not difficult, in SE, to find “theory” in this sense of
“theoretical content”. The existence of bodies of knowledge
and classical textbooks on the subject of SE could be used
1A third issue happens in lay language, when “theory” is
misused as a synonym of “hypothesis”.
as a proof. However, theories in the scientific sense, who
explain different aspects of the SE world and are supported
by a strong set of empirical evidence, are still missed.
2.2 Do we miss “laws” in SE?
In [5] it is said that, despite some opinions, “theory is
abundant” in SE, and examples of scientific theory are pro-
vided (the logarithmic curve of change costs, information
hiding, etc.) but, as the authors show, they are very small
and casual. We claim that those examples are actually more
akin to scientific laws than to scientific theories. This situa-
tion is also reflected in [4] where it is shown that theory use
is very local in empirical SE research, with a lack of theory
building efforts. Again, we claim that the reason is because
that research is more law- than theory-oriented.
Scientific theories go beyond scientific laws, as these are
narrower in scope, usually circumscribed to a particular cause-
consequence relationship. For example, Boyle’s law explains
the relationship between gas pressure and volume. Laws can
be part of a theory but they are not a theory by themselves.
In fact, it is the great context of a theory what explains a
scientific law. In this sense, Boyle’s Law can be derived from
the Kinetic Theory of Gases. Another example is Planck’s
Law, about black body radiation, that is included in, and
explained by, Quantum Theory.
The fact that in SE there is a set of well-established laws
must be welcome, but the issue about the lack of SE theories
still remains. A general theory of SE, even a wrong theory,
needs to look farther than a mere set of laws, however precise
and useful they are. If we pay attention to the most success-
ful scientific theories, we will find very good structure and
internal organization, where laws are pieces subordinated to
the overall architecture of the theory. We will return later
to this issue of theory structuring. In resume:
• Yes, there is theoretical content in SE, like there is in
the fields of literature, film, etc. Is that enough?
• Yes, there are laws in SE that explain cause-consequence
relationships, well-known by the SE community of re-
searchers and practitioners. Are those laws enough?
So the question of ”where’s the theory for SE?” [5] still re-
mains, but we hope to have scoped that question a little.
3. THE REFERENTS OF A SE THEORY
To illustrate the problem of finding the reference class of
a sentence, let’s take “all swans are white” or ∀(x) Swan(x)
⇒ White(x). Leaving aside the truth or falsity of the sen-
tence, it looks like a sentence about swans. However, it
is equivalent to ∀(x) ¬White(x) ⇒ ¬Swan(x) so finding
any non-white object (an apple, for instance) that is not a
swan would seem to provide empirical support. It is dubious
that such piece of empirical evidence would be accepted by
an ornithologist. Actually, in an ornithology context, the
sentence would be regarded as a sentence about birds and
nothing else. Usually, in scientific contexts, the referents of
a theory are better defined than in lay contexts, but this is
not always the case and is not a trivial matter.
In Physics, Quantum Theory is about microparticles and
microsystems, and that is how scientifics use it in their daily
work at CERN or other research facilities. However, some-
times they affirm that the theory is about microsystems plus
measurement apparatus plus conscious observers. Accord-
ing to the prominent Physicist E. Wigner, historically, when
physics tried to encompass the microscopic world “it was not
possible to formulate the laws of quantum mechanics in a
fully consistent way without reference to the consciousness”
[7]. Despite that, researchers in the physics field proceed ev-
eryday without paying attention to consciousness in the for-
mulas they use, probably because there is nothing on those
formulas that points to consciousness at all (in other words,
consciousness is not in the reference class of the formulas).
Heisenberg said that Quantum Theory is not about Nature,
but about the knowledge of Nature instead [2]. However, the
equations in the theory do not contain variables that point
to observers or knowledgeable beings or apparatus and, in
fact, those theories are true even for particles that are in
far-away galaxies. Other controversies arise in biology: is
Evolution Theory about individuals, species, populations,
genes or all of them at the same time? Is Relativity Theory
also about observers? What about Control Theory? Control
Theory can be applied to machines and animals so, what’s
in its reference class? If setting the referents of a theory is
controversial in well-established fields, SE is not an excep-
tion. Formally expressed, the basic question of finding what
a theory for SE should talk about is:
Which real-world objects, properties and pro-
cesses should be in the reference class of a Soft-
ware Engineering Theory?
This is a question that is independent of the true or fal-
sity of potential theories. A false theory about electrical
charges still has electrically charged bodies in its reference
class. In fact, having false theories and proving (empiri-
cally) that they are false, is always welcomed. Competing
theories must exist in order to choose the better ones, but
only theories that share elements in their reference classes
are competitive. A theory about protein synthesis does not
compete with a theory about unemployment, unless some-
one discovers a third theory that connects protein synthe-
sis with unemployment. In SE, for instance, does a the-
ory about software patterns relate to theories about market
share? Is this even a legitimate question or should be out of
the scope of any potential SE theory?
As a first step, it looks easy to point out to real objects
that apparently should not be part of the reference class. On
the one hand, nobody would seriously think that motorcy-
cles, minerals or proteins should be part of it. On the other
hand, source code, requirements documents or test cases
that should possibly be there. But what about contracts,
CPUs or salaries? What about organization structures or
project schedules? A prominent feature of the potential ele-
ments to be included in the reference class for a SE theory is
that they are created by humans, and do not exist in nature,
which takes us to the following section.
4. A SCIENCE OF THE ARTIFICIAL
Wrongly or not, we are taking scientific theories as our
“role model”. However, both the NAS and the AAAS define
scientific theories by remarking that they make reference
to the natural world. So, how can SE be the subject of a
scientific theory when it deals with human produced arti-
facts? For finding an answer we should pay attention to
the studies of H. A. Simon on the Sciences of the Artificial
[6]. These sciences deal with the practical issues of con-
ceiving and constructing new and useful artifacts, not with
the study of pre-existing objects like sciences of nature do.
Hence, according to our discussion on the reference class of
scientific theories, a theory about engineering should contain
statements not only about the software itself but also about
the humans and the activities they are engaged in during
the construction process.
Let’s consider first what happens in other engineering
fields, by taking Electrical Engineering (EE) as the paradigm.
EE rests, among others, on Maxwell’s Theory, which is about
electrically charged bodies and fields. However, a theory
about electrical charges is not an EE theory, because EE is
what electrical engineers do, which is mainly to design, con-
struct, fabricate and test electrical equipment, given a set
of limited resources, tools, knowledge, etc. Maxwell’s equa-
tions do not care about the process of building and testing
new devices (i.e. those elements are not in its reference
class). Which features, then, should have a SE theory that
is not a merely a theory of software? In order to answer this,
we propose this distinction:
• Laws and Theories whose reference class includes the
objects that belong to the subject matter of any engi-
neering (bodies, fields, materials, engines, etc.) will be
called Foundation Laws or Theories (briefly, F-Laws
or F-Theories). Example: Boyle’s Law, Hooke’s Law,
Maxwell’s Theory, KTG, etc.
• Laws and Theories whose reference class includes the
engineering practice (from the subject matter to the
people involved, the designs and its evolution, the test-
ing processes, etc.) will be called Engineering Laws or
Theories (E-Laws or E-Theories). Examples: Manu-
facture Scheduling Theory, Brooks’s Law, etc.
Simplifying, F-Theories belong to the Sciences of the Nat-
ural and E-Theories to the Sciences of the Artificial. Tra-
ditional engineering fields are based upon a solid basis of
F-Theories but they are not specially rich on E-theories or,
at least, on particular E-theories specially fitted to each en-
gineering subdomain. These engineering practices rely on
a well-developed set of domain-independent E-theories (like
scheduling theory or planning theory) which can be adapted
to the particularities of, for instance, civil or naval engineer-
ing. For instance, in EE, despite the wide corpus of well-
tested F-theories in use, it is not easy to find an E-Theory
that is EE-specific, perhaps because the need of such a the-
ory was, historically, less urgent in EE that it is in SE. Other
engineering domains were traditionally more prone to task
decomposition and parallelization; not so in SE, as the Soft-
ware Crisis clearly showed. This is why the debunking of
the person-month myth [1] never happened until the sec-
ond half of the 20th Century, in a software context, a fact
whose importance is usually underrated. It is the opinion
of this author that SE should not envy other engineerings,
because they are also not specially rich in E-Theories. How-
ever, the need for an E-Theory is more urgent in SE due to
its characteristics. This is what gives SE a special place in
the landscape of engineering.
In the case of software we may regard the corpus of Com-
puter Science theories (programming language theory, com-
plexity theory, algorithmic, etc.) as our F-Theories. We
have also some E-Laws but, and this is at the core of the
position of this paper, finding E-Theories is more urgent in
SE than in any other fields, due to special characteristics of
software development. In the same way, other engineering
fields were traditionally less interested in E-Theories than
we are (traditionally, of course, because they are also incor-
porating software in their domains, and start suffering the
same problems that plagued SE). SE, from its early days,
is known by the highly interaction that is present among
subtasks and by the sheer importance of human factors and
management issues. I suggest the reader to compare SE
textbooks with those in other engineering fields, and ob-
serve the amount of material devoted to human factor and
organizational issues in SE books. In fact, it could be said
that it was this human-factor awareness what actually gave
birth to the SE discipline, as a means to break free from the
tar pit [1]. As this human and organizational factor is so
relevant, we should incorporate it in our potential theories.
In other words, F-Theories and E-laws are welcome, but
what we need in SE are E-Theories. This paper suggest to
start with the popular three P’s of SE, or PPP, as a first
approximation towards establishing the reference class of an
SE E-Theory. These three P’s are:
• People: Engineers, users, testers and, possibly, other
stakeholders involved in the SE effort.
• Product: Artifacts generated during a SE effort, in-
cluding the computer programs (i.e., not only the al-
gorithms, understood as a mathematical construct).
• Process: The different steps carried out by the People
in order to transform the Product through different
stages which, following [6], should include the search
for design alternatives, evaluation of alternatives, rep-
resentations and their transformation, among others.
In this proposal, an E-Theory of SE must refer to the three
Ps together. A theory about one, or two, of the P’s would be
a partial SE E-theory (but could be part of a wider theory).
We believe this PPP proposal is, at least, a basis to trigger
a discussion on the subject matter of SE theory.
5. THEORIES HAVE STRUCTURE
Scientific theories are constituted by well organized sen-
tences. They are not just a random set of consistent affirma-
tions about some real world domain. An example of a the-
ory with a deep and well-developed structure is the Theory
of Evolution in its Modern Synthesis, where Darwinism ex-
plains phenomena and Genetics explains the reasons behind
those phenomena. Another example is the KTG: macro and
micro level are in perfect harmony and what happens at the
molecular level explains what happens at the macro level.
In the software world it would be wise to ask if, in addition
of searching for new E-theories, perhaps it would be wise
to better structure the knowledge we already have, mostly
under the form of F-Theories and E-laws. In this way, and
in analogy to the KTG, we could relate the macro and mi-
cro landscapes. Examples of research questions pointing to
this goal may be: does object orientation increase the per-
formance of the usability evaluation process? If yes, or not,
which are the reasons? Which software architectures do im-
prove user involvement in the development process, if any?
Which is the relationship, if there is one, between the struc-
ture of development teams and non-functional requirements
like robustness or availability? If there is no relationship,
why? Other examples are given in [4]: “expert familiarity of
design patterns when designing safety-critical systems in a
short time-to-market strategy, leads to better reliability”, or
“comment lines describing design patter usage will increase
programmer performance”.
These are examples of questions that could be explained
by good E-theories in SE, or that could give birth to such
E-theories, if more effort is put into their study and valida-
tion. And, if these questions make no sense, that could also
be explained by good theory. Searching in the literature, it
is possible to find works that already point in this direction,
of finding explanatory connections between software-related
issues that happen at different levels. In [3] empirical evi-
dence is provided for sentences like “the architecture of the
software alters the number of programmers that can effec-
tively work together”, or “If software is improperly coupled
then people are improperly coupled”, where“improper” is de-
fined by the presence of some visible attributes like rigidity,
fragility, immobility and viscosity [3]. From their findings,
predictions can be made, as “the lack of coupling manage-
ment tasks within a project will slow down development”.
Independently of which was the goal of the researchers, these
are good examples of sentences that link the three P’s, with
empirical support, being then good candidates to become
the seed of, or be part of, a potential E-theory.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The position of this paper is: (i) Semantically: To use
PPP as the reference class of prospective SE E-theories and
(ii) Methodologically: To structure and organize already
known material. Of course, both (i) and (ii) go together,
because the structuring of the material could be guided by
its coverage of PPP. Optimistically, we could say that we
already have F-laws, F-theories and E-laws, but we are in a
strong need of E-theories, understood as well organized and
empirically testable sets of sentences whose reference class
are the People, the Process and the Product.
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